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Abstract 
This paper re-examines the images that were associated with the 
Syrian refugee crisis between 2015-2018 through a case study in-
vestigating depictions in the mainstream narrative. The main con-
tribution of the paper is to establish a link between the mainstream 
narrative and the negative images of Syrian refugees, and to draw 
parallels between the media and political discourse surrounding 
this subject. The main argument is that the mainstream narrative 
has significantly contributed to communicating a negative image 
of Syrian refugees in host societies through a stereotyped catego-
rization. It aggravated the negative image of Syrian refugees 
through overreaction, panic, and by placing focus on the most 
controversial and sensitive problems in the host communities, 
such as demography, unemployment, and security.  
 
Introduction 
The tension and prolonged duration of the Syrian crisis aggra-
vated the negative images of refugees regionally and internation-
ally. The importance of this paper stems from the fact that it 
tackles a crisis unprecedented since the Second World War 
(1939-1945). 13 million have been displaced since the conflict 
erupted in 2011, accounting for about 60% of the population be-
fore the war, mainly distributed in neighbouring counties, North 
Africa, Europe and North America.1 More than five million have 
sought refuge in neighbouring countries: Turkey (3.4 million), 
Lebanon (1 million), Jordan (660,000) and Iraq (250,000). More 
than 150,000 live in North African counties such as Egypt 
(130,000) and Libya. About one million refugees or asylum seek-
ers live in Europe: Germany (530,000 representing the fifth larg-
est refugee population in the world), Sweden (110,000) and 
Austria (50,000). There are approximately 100,000 refugees in 
North America, representing less than 1% of the total number of 
Syrian refugees worldwide.2 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the negative images that 
were associated with Syrian refugees since the eruption of the 
civil war in 2011 through a case study of the mainstream narrative 
in Lebanon. The main argument is that the mainstream narrative 
has significantly contributed to communicating a negative image 
of Syrian refugees through overreaction and panic. The paper ar-
gues that the mainstream narrative constructed a stereotyped im-
age of Syrian refugees as dangerous and undisciplined. They pose 
a risk to the safety of the host societies, its political and economic 
well-being, and are incompatible with its culture. It claimed that 
they are primarily male and highlighted the absence of women 
and children. It communicated an image of women as victims of 
domestic or community violence, victims of human trafficking or 
victims of a prevailing masculine mentality. 
The methodology section discusses the social research method 
used in the paper to obtain and analyse data. The social and polit-
ical context section provides a broad overview of the social and 
political context in Lebanon, the relations between Syria and Leb-
anon and the eruption of civil war in Syria in 2011. The literature 
review section analyses the secondary sources and academic au-
thors’ arguments concerning the research question. The theoreti-
cal framework section positions the theory within the broad 
framework of social constructivism. The section on the main-
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stream narrative provides images of Syrian refugees in the Leba-
nese mainstream media, ranging from being pitiful victims to be-
ing ISIS affiliates. The subsequent section on parallels between 
the media discourse and the political discourse analyses the cor-
relation between the media outlets on the one hand and the polit-
ical powers and wealthy families on the other. The conclusion 
restates the main finding on the dominance of one mainstream 
narrative communicating a negative image of Syrian refugees, 
and the absence of a counter narrative. 
 
Methodology 
The main contribution of the paper is to establish a link between 
the mainstream narrative and the negative images of Syrian refu-
gees. The main question concerns how the mainstream narrative 
contributed to communicating a negative image of Syrian refu-
gees between 2015-2018. The paper uses case studies, which in-
volves an up-close, in-depth, and detailed examination of the 
subject of study in relation to the contextual conditions.3 The pa-
per adopts social constructivism as a theoretical framework, 
which maintains that human development is socially situated and 
knowledge is constructed through interaction with others.4 The 
research analyses mainstream narratives, which are defined as the 
majority cultural practices of a society. These can be used to de-
scribe the lens through which history is told from the perspective 
of the dominant culture. This term has been described as an invis-
ible hand that guides reality and perceived reality. Since the nar-
rative can be true or imaginary, these two terms together create 
the notion of ‘dominant narrative’, which refers to those who oc-
cupy the dominant group in different aspects of life, such as me-
dia and activism,5 whose stories are told, and therefore heard.6 
The paper uses narrative analysis7 to facilitate its examination of 
the news, media and interviews as the units of analysis to research 
and understand the way people create meaning in their lives. It 
centres on the organisation of human knowledge more than the 
collection and processing of data. This technique captures the mi-
nute portrayed, infused with the unrevealed meaning communi-
cated by the teller.8  
Twenty anonymous semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Five more semi-struc-
tured quality interviews were conducted with Syrian officials 
from the Foreign Office, and five more with officials from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of-
fice in Damascus. Five additional semi-structured quality inter-
views were conducted with Lebanese nationals. The interviews 
focused on the personal experiences of the interviewees vis-à-vis 
the research question and the images of Syrian refugees in the 
mainstream narratives in Lebanon. The interviews were particu-
larly important within the larger methodology in explaining, un-
derstanding and exploring the research question, while open-
ended questions provided in-depth insightful information. Inter-
views were conducted via Skype in Arabic. Primary data were 
also obtained from the news, media and interviews by the Leba-
nese news agencies and television. My previous career in the Syr-
ian Foreign Office, and the UNHCR office in Damascus 
facilitated access to the interviewees with a broader understand-
ing of the narrative.  
To avoid bias and to explore different narratives fairly, the ma-
jor Lebanese media outlets between 2015-2018 were reviewed 
with no selectivity, exclusion or consideration as to political ori-
entation or religion. These were: Noursat TV, Aljadeed TV, Al-
manar TV, MTV, Future TV, LBC TV, National News Agency, 
Tele Liban TV, Jabal Lebnan FM, Nostalgie FM, Radio Liban 
Libre, Radio Voix du Liban, Albinaa Newspaper, Cedar News, 
Arabweek Magazine, Femme Magazine, Ediori Magazine, Al-
mughtareb Magazine, Almassira Magazine, Almarkazia News 
Agency, Daily Star Newspaper, Lorient Lejour Newspaper, 
Aldyar Newspaper, Almustaqbal Newspaper, Alhayat Newspa-
per, Alanwar Newspaper, Alsafir Newspaper, Alnaher Newspa-
per, Aljoumhouria Newspaper, Alakhbar Newspaper, Aliktissad 
Magazine.9 These represent the major political actors in Lebanon, 
including: Gebran Bassil, Nabih Berri, Hassan Nasrallah, Saad 
Hariri, Samir Geagea and Walid Jumblatt. 
The focus of the paper was news and entertainment programs. 
Data collected from interviews, notes, video and audio record-
ings, images, and text documents were gathered and examined as 
a whole. Notes were made on first impressions. The collected data 
were then revised again, one by one and read line by line. Sections 
relevant to the research question were labelled, then more precise 
relevant words, phrases, sentences, or sections about actions, ac-
tivities, concepts, differences, opinions, or processes were la-
belled. The data were categorised and compared on a more 
Narratives of Transformation  207 
 
general, abstract, and conceptual level. The most relevant catego-
ries were labelled and their connections to each other examined.10 
 
Social and political context 
Lebanon is characterised as culturally Arab, permeated with 
Western influences, French in particular. For a long time, it was 
the only country with a Christian majority in the Arab world, but 
the Christian majority has declined in comparison to the Muslims 
population, which caused the country to undergo significant po-
litical change.11 A civil war between 1975-1990 had its origin in 
the conflicts and political compromises of Lebanon’s post-Otto-
man period and was exacerbated by the nation’s changing demo-
graphic trends, inter-religious strife, and proximity to Syria, the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel. It began as a 
conflict between Christians on the one hand, and the Palestinians 
and the national movement on the other. The conflict was com-
plicated and changed the demography, which encouraged Mus-
lims to demand greater participation in the government.12  
On the 6th of June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied 
Beirut in an attempt to stop Palestinian forces from attacking its 
territories. The invasion ended with the departure of the Palestin-
ian and Syrian forces from Lebanon, and the signing of an agree-
ment on the 17th of May 1983. Both allies and enemies resumed 
fighting, which justified the return of the Syrian forces in 1983 
for the deterrence of further violence and the restoration of peace 
and stability. The war ended on the 30th of September 1989 with 
the Taif Agreement, which emphasised the special relations be-
tween Lebanon and Syria, and affirmed Lebanon’s independence 
and Arab identity. It stipulated a set of political reforms, most im-
portantly the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives 
equally between Muslims and Christians, and detracted the pow-
ers of the President of the Republic in favour of the Council of 
Ministers.13  
In 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced a full 
withdrawal from Lebanon. After the extension of the term of the 
President of the Republic Emile Lahoud, the UN issued resolution 
1559/2004 which demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces and 
the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese militia. On the 14th 
of February 2005, President Rafic Hariri was assassinated. 
Demonstrations demanded the withdrawal of Syrian forces and 
the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate and 
punish the killers. Syria’s allies rallied a huge demonstration on 
the 8th of March in Lebanon, saluting the Syrian army. Lebanese 
anti-Syrian presence groups held a huge counter demonstration 
on the 14th of March. Since then, the Lebanese split into two 
camps, the ‘8th of March’ and the ‘14th of March’. In July 2006, 
Lebanon was the site of a 34-day military conflict between Hez-
bollah and Israel, which erupted in response to Hezbollah’s cap-
ture of Israeli soldiers. It severely damaged the Lebanese civil 
infrastructure and displaced approximately one million Leba-
nese.14  
In March 2011, a civil war erupted in Syria and caused a major 
refugee crisis and influx of millions of refugees. The war was 
fought by several factions such as the Syrian government’s armed 
forces and its international allies, an alliance of majority Sunni 
opposition rebel groups, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
and Salafi jihadist groups, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A number of counties in 
the region and beyond were involved either directly or indirectly 
and provided support to one faction or another. The fighting 
spilled over to Lebanon between 2011-2017 as opponents and 
supporters of the Syrian government travelled to Lebanon to fight 
and attack each other on Lebanese soil. According to the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute, given the complexity 
of the Syrian conflict, bias in media reporting remains a funda-
mental challenge that misinforms researchers and misguides pol-
icy makers regarding the actual events.15  
The social and political context aggravated the images of Syr-
ian refugees in the mainstream narratives which were projected 
against a background of Lebanon’s exposure to a series of serious 
socio-economic and political crises, which were a result of inter-
action among internal and external dynamics since the civil war 
in Lebanon, long before the Syrian refugee crisis. The increased 
expenditure failed to satisfy the public services and meet the ris-
ing demands amid a sharp decline in trade, tourism and invest-
ment. Lebanon suffered from a shortage of water supplies, which 
led to a decline in sanitation, electricity and employability. Stand-
ards of living declined, and many Lebanese have reached a level 
of poverty and struggle to meet their basic needs and expenses.16 
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Literature review 
A study by the ABAAD Resource Centre for Gender Equality,17 
in partnership with the International Women’s Association for 
Peace and Freedom, reviewed 504 articles published in three Leb-
anese newspapers: Alsafir, Alnahar and Alakhbar, over a period 
of 13 months between 2015-2016, in addition to 142 news reports 
by the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, MTV and Aljadeed 
TV. The qualitative analysis of the content showed that the over-
all press reports depicted Syrian refugee women as victims of do-
mestic or community violence, victims of human trafficking or 
victims of a prevailing masculine mentality. The study referred to 
the perpetuation of the stereotyped image of Syrian women as 
guilty through images and videos that were published in the ma-
terial. The material was associated with human trafficking and 
accompanied by images of sex trade or photos of women living 
in refugee camps, stereotyping and mainstreaming the Syrian ref-
ugee status in Lebanon.18 The study concluded that the surveys 
showed a prevailing logic of generalisation and/or marginalisa-
tion in the Lebanese media dealing with Syrian refugees in line 
with the media system of the Lebanese political authorities. It 
communicated an image of Syrian refugee women as victims that 
have no political, social or economic role.19 
A study by the Maharat Foundation20, the Media Monitoring 
Unit in Lebanon and Jordan, and the Arabic Network for Human 
Rights Information concluded that the Lebanese media coverage 
had been politicised and weighed against the national interest of 
Lebanon and aid from donors.21 The literature on Syrian refugees, 
however, did not establish a link between the mainstream narra-
tive and the negative images of Syrian refugees, and parallel be-
tween the media discourse and the political discourse, a gap 
which this paper attempts to fill. 
 
Theoretical framework 
This section positions the theory within the broad framework of 
social constructivism in connection with the main argument to 
unpack the meanings of mainstream narratives of Syrian refugees. 
The influence and importance of the media in daily life continues 
to grow phenomenally. It has the ability to disseminate infor-
mation and to encourage the citizens-customers to accept it with-
out critical or conscious interpretations or informed 
understanding. An important factor in the development of media 
is the technological advances that contributed to the rapid spread 
of media and gave more power to the presentation of reality and 
the state of society as it corresponds to the creators and construc-
tors of that reality. Media has become part of everyday life by 
constantly issuing updated information, or constantly repeating 
other information so that it makes this information inevitable, cre-
ating an illusion in modern individuals that s/he is a member of 
the ‘global society’. The highlight of this illusion is the created 
‘image of reality’ in which the life of the modern human is un-
thinkable without the mass media. Media not only affects the in-
dividual, but also the entire society as a collective, as a space in 
which individuals meet their individual needs, achieves interests 
and realizes or loses their potential, talents or ideas.22 
Ideally, media mediates between people, groups, communities, 
institutions and other social actors, to be the means of mass com-
munication in society. However, media, through the explanation 
and interpretation of the information, ‘constructs’ the social real-
ity in the sense that it adds to the information some elements that 
the original information did not have, that it forms information 
according to the requirements or the expectations of the centres 
of power, or some other interest groups. Mass media includes 
news and information, entertainment, powerful educational tools 
and more. It is the instrument of social control by special interest 
groups, individuals, institutions and countries. The entire set of 
social entities affects the creating of the illusion of the existence 
of a specific, autonomous, necessary and ‘desirable’ culture.23 
With rapidly evolving media and technological tools, social 
constructivism holds that meaning-making is created through ac-
tive engagement with knowledge and social interaction. In the age 
of cable TV, internet and cell phones, media shapes how people 
make meaning of and construct knowledge in the world. It creates 
new and larger communities reaching a broader spectrum.24 The 
cognitive equilibration process of assimilation and accommoda-
tion of new experiences to one’s knowing system, or the sociocul-
tural appropriation of new skills, evolves through opportunities to 
interact in social networks online or mediated through computer 
or mobile technologies. Knowledge occurs through shared activ-
ity, through community engagement, dialogue, and communica-
tion in a community of shared activity.25 
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The Mainstream Narrative 
The mainstream narrative has arguably communicated a negative 
image of Syrian refugees. Fake refugee images, photos and 
memes have been used to demonise them and distort public opin-
ion. Many of these photos were edited or taken out of context in 
an effort to support a myth or argument, such as that ISIS jihadists 
are using Syrian refugees to infiltrate Europe, or that refugees are 
healthy, rich and do not need help. Several photos have surfaced 
online claiming to show Syrian refugees who came to Lebanon 
comparing them with more recent images of ISIS militants. How-
ever, even in cases where the photos appear to be of the same 
person, identification between photos has not been proven. Fol-
lowing an assertion by the Lebanese Minster of Education, Elias 
Bou Saab, to the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, in 2015 
that one in 50 Syrians entering Europe could be an ISIS mem-
ber,26 a spokesperson for the UNHCR noted that there is no legit-
imate way of proving such figures, and that this kind of statement 
is extremely unhelpful.27 
In 2015, Aljadeed TV broadcast randomised interviews with 
Lebanese nationals expressing stereotyped views. It communi-
cated an image of refugees as scared homeless beggars spreading 
in the streets all around Lebanon. They eat the food of the Leba-
nese and deprive them of job opportunities through providing 
cheap labour. Some interviewees identified Syrian refugees as 
suspicious or ISIS affiliates. Others were racist and expressed 
contempt towards them as uncivilised dark-skinned invaders. 
Others interestingly noted that Syrian refugees do not deserve any 
sympathy because they put themselves in this situation when they 
revolted, while at the same time they themselves re-elected pres-
ident Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian embassy in Beirut in 2014.28  
Demography is understandably a sensitive issue in Lebanon 
that shaped its attitude towards Arabism and broader pan-nation-
alistic causes.29 The fact that Lebanon is comprised of different 
religious and ethnic groups and minorities explains the fear of a 
demographic imbalance resulting from the flow of large numbers 
of Muslim refugees. However, this has been arguably exagger-
ated and propagandised to panic. A journalist in Alnahar, Hussein 
Hazouri, claimed that Syrian refugees have changed the identity, 
culture and demography of Lebanon as they constituted two mil-
lion versus the Lebanese who were four million.30 His claim how-
ever, conflicts with the statements by the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, and UN statistics stating that 
there were 1,172,753 Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 201531 and a 
Lebanese population of 5.851 million.32 
In a report in 2015, France 24 described the labour of Syrian 
refugee adolescents in farming, car repair or food delivery as a 
daily fact. Arguably however, it did not explain the phenomenon 
against the decision of Minister of Labour, Sajaan Qazzi, who 
confined the Syrian labour to cleaning, farming or building,33 and 
who were consequently not expected to practice prestigious jobs. 
Its attitude towards the challenges facing Syrian children in Leb-
anese schools was arguably not on educational and pedagogic 
grounds. It depicted them as untalented and uncompetitive in 
comparison with their Lebanese peers, who are taught in either 
French or English. “During the class of French, the pupils repeat 
mechanically after the teacher, ‘Jad mange du pain avec un verre 
de lait’34 two times, then the teacher asks them what Jad ate in the 
morning? Silent, the teacher finds himself obliged to re-explain 
in Arabic. When they pray, they do not understand a word, they 
do not even know the alphabet”. France 24 claimed that in each 
of the schools they visited, there were children who never had 
never been to school before, and children in adolescence who did 
not know how to read or write.35 Such a claim is, however, debat-
able because in 2015, the first wave of refugees had been only 
settled in Lebanon for four years. They arrived in May from Talk-
alakh in Homs, where education, reading and writing is free and 
strictly mandatory in accordance with law 35/1981, and law 
32/2002.36  
In an article published by Alnahar in October 2016, an aca-
demic professor Mona Fayyad warned that Syrian refugees have 
launched an armed conflict among themselves and against the 
Lebanese forces, and could consequently be viewed as a time-
bomb that would eventually undermine security and stability. She 
condemned racism in general, but maintained that theorising was 
one thing, and practice was another. The repercussions of the Syr-
ian refugee crisis was unprecedented and required a different de-
scription that goes beyond the racist cliché. The increase in the 
number of refugees, she claimed, led to an increase in the number 
and quality of crimes that were not previously known, such as 
slaughtering and beheading. Syrian refugees serve as a tool in the 
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hand of some parties that exploit their desperate conditions and 
destitution in return for aid.37 
Fayyad explained the attitude of Syrian refugees from a phys-
ical perspective that also takes into account other factors such as 
genetics and biology, psychology and frustration. To support her 
argument, she explained that interactions in an empty container 
of air are different from those that occur in a full container. A vital 
space is required to allow a good and balanced life for living or-
ganisms. Losing this space resulting from extreme overcrowding 
disrupts these balances and produces a full extent of new, threat-
ened, uncoordinated and aggressive behaviours. Ethology ex-
plains this phenomenon hypothesising that what regulates 
population waves in mammals is physiological mechanism as a 
response to density. The claim is proven in caged animals re-
sponding to density with stress and releasing lethal or fatal steroid 
secretions.38 
A report published in 2016 by Alnahar entitled ‘The deteriora-
tion of air quality after Syrian asylum’, blamed air pollution on 
Syrian refugees, through linking increased fire accidents and the 
increasing number of Syrian refugees.39 Another report published 
in 2017 by MTV, entitled ‘The heads of Lebanese hairdressers 
are exposed to scourge by Syrian scissors’, talks about a Syrian 
invasion of the profession, claiming that Syrian workers were tak-
ing over the jobs of the Lebanese.40 Another report by Aldiyar 
published in May 2017 claimed that 300,000 Syrian refugee 
women were to give birth in 2017, while the birth rates between 
2011-2017 were less than 100,000.41 
On the 20th of April 2018, Aljadeed TV presented a sarcastic 
song of Syrian refugees, performed by Layal Daou in an enter-
tainment programme. It handles the working class with scorn and 
contempt, mocks the Syrian dialect and expresses resentment of 
the frequent birth of children, which made the Lebanese a minor-
ity. In an interview with the editor and director, Charbel Khalil 
argued that the song is an expression of the social conditions in 
caricature, and denied charges of racism and calls against Syrian 
refugees. Another sketch by Charbel Khalil on LBC suggested 
that the Syrian women appealed to the Lebanese men because 
they are cheaper. A Lebanese lover abandoned his Lebanese be-
loved because their relationship is costly. He noted that he could 
engage with two Syrian women for the same cost.42 
Fadi Dahouk, a journalist, claimed that the song was a form of 
provocative abuse and a threat to the lives of vulnerable refugees. 
It is consistent with the Lebanese mainstream narrative attitude 
presenting Syrian refugees as human mass desiring to occupy 
Lebanon and control its wealth.43 Layal Haddad, head of the me-
dia department in Alaraby Aljadeed, noted that the song is not 
separated from a stereotypical portrayal of Syrian refugees in the 
Lebanese mainstream narrative; women work in human traffick-
ing, and men steal, loot and rape. They have no talents, and they 
seek asylum to live on subsidies. They are primitive people, who 
have many children and work in popular professions, such as taxis 
drivers or wardens.44 Hussein Berro, a dramatist from Istanbul, 
maintained that the influence of the song goes beyond its lyrics 
because of its targeting a sweeping majority of popular audiences. 
Entertainment episodes are the most watched and can convey 
messages which the target audience would accept subcon-
sciously. The song has psychological and heritage connotations 
because of its techniques. Its beautiful tune carries history, culture 
and heritage of the Levant. Its folkloric melody is vivid and sim-
ilar to love and wedding songs, which makes it easy to remember 
and echo.45 
In September 2018, MTV published a special report that linked 
Syrian refugees to the increase of cancer rates in Lebanon, which 
the Lebanese Ministry of Health documented as 5.6 percent in 
2018. In an interview, a medical specialist, Fadi Nasr, attributed 
the increase to two reasons: pollution and Syrian refugees. He ex-
plained that “the increasing infections caused by the spread of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon are directly causing cancer. Because 
of the poor conditions they have suffered from, they come with 
dangerous bacteria that can create diseases in humans.”46 Mr. 
Nasr and MTV, however, did not refer to any evidence or studies 
that led to these findings. 
In 2018 in an entertainment episode on LBCI, Take Me Out, 
the candidate responded to a question of whether he can speak 
Syrian dialect with “I am very racist! I prefer the devil to Syri-
ans.”47 While this could arguably be seen as an individual attitude, 
the reaction and applause of the audience suggest that it might not 
be, and that the program has changed the Syrian catastrophe into 
material for an entertainment episode. It is also in line with a sep-
arate survey by Insider Monkey that Lebanon is number one in 
figures for racism regionally, and number two globally.48 A Leb-
anese journalist, Rana Najar noted that the attitude towards Syrian 
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refugees is based on their social class. Rich businessmen are not 
exposed to racism or aggression because of their contribution to 
the economic welfare of Lebanon, the mainstream narrative 
avoids telling such stories that may conflict with the dominant 
stereotyped narrative, and suggests the existence of a counter nar-
rative or images of Syrian refugees investing or hiring Lebanese 
labour.49 
 
Parallel between media discourse and political discourse 
This section provides paradigmatic examples of widespread nar-
ratives that have been consistent across different media and re-
mained the same between 2015-2018. The dominance of one 
mainstream narrative and absence of a counter narrative in Leba-
non introduces a parallel between the media discourse and the po-
litical discourse. Minister of Information Melhem Riachi 
acknowledged a deficiency in the mainstream narrative and me-
dia. In a joint workshop with the UNHCR on 3 August 2017, he 
noted: “We need to market positive media in Lebanon, and when 
we say positive media, we do not mean to hide facts or objectivity, 
but not to market a Syrian refugee who is a killer as if all refugees 
are killers. Such claim is racist, untrue and inhuman. The refugees 
are protected by law, which is above all. You are professional 
journalists and there is a great responsibility on all of you until 
Syrian refugees come back home safely. Your narrative should be 
positive, sensible, logical and courageous. It is only love that 
would eradicate tension between the guest and the host.”50 The 
statement, which could be seen by different standards as bal-
anced, was however criticised by Lebanese journalists who 
viewed it as an attempt to silence and tame them.51 
Arguably, a parallel can be observed between the media dis-
course and political discourse. There are two explanations for this 
pattern. The first is the fact that most of the local media is owned 
or directed by the political powers which determine the overall 
course of the media discourse.52 Contrary to many other Arab 
countries, the Lebanese government does not control media out-
lets. However, political parties have the power to influence and 
direct the majority of Lebanese media institutions, which reflect 
the country’s sectarian politics and serve as a mouthpiece for po-
litical propaganda. With the media being entangled in national 
politics and international influence peddling, journalists are argu-
ably required to act like political activists. Since media outlets do 
not rely on readership, but rather on investors and political or sec-
tarian affiliations, there is little interest in producing quality me-
dia. Bribing journalists to publish a certain piece of information, 
or to avoid any further analysis on specific matters has become 
common practice.53 
In her work ‘The Lebanese media: Anatomy of a system in 
perpetual crisis’,54 Sarha El-Richani’s adaptation of Hallin and 
Mancini’s media typology to the Lebanese system functions as a 
scholarly springboard that moves the typology beyond the west-
ern world. As such, her critical assessment of the Lebanese sys-
tem through Hallin and Mancini’s four dimensions leads to an 
amended model that takes into consideration the unique elements 
that render the Lebanese system a variation of the Polarized Plu-
ralist Model. Analysing the major tenets of Hallin and Mancini’s 
framework, including a focus on the nation-state as a unit of anal-
ysis, as well as its goal of identifying patterns across various me-
dia systems, the key components of the Lebanese political system 
and the nature of governance, El-Richani labels Lebanon as a 
‘weak state’, which comes as a result of the critical role of the 
Lebanese populist political patrons in deteriorating the country’s 
political and media systems.55 
Examination of ownership patterns of media, the high level of 
staff and audience partisanship, as well as patterns in guest ap-
pearances on broadcast shows characterise a high level of politi-
cal parallelism. This is evident in the direct relationship between 
the media and political groupings,56 which explains the bias in 
communicating the images of Syrian refugees. Key indicators, 
such as the poor organization of the profession, the use of jour-
nalists as instruments of the powerful, and low ethical standards, 
which are mainly a result of low salaries and bribery, suggest that 
the Lebanese media system has low levels of professionalism. El-
Richani’s assessment of the media market indicates that, given 
the political and sectarian frames of the Lebanese media, com-
bined with the inability of the Lebanese press to generate sustain-
able income through advertising and a fragmented regional 
market that has so far only had room for entertainment program-
ming at the expense of Lebanese political show, Lebanese media 
parallel with political grouping.57  
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A joint report by Reports Without Borders and the Centre for 
the Defence of Media and Cultural Freedoms in 2018, on the own-
ership of media institutions, based on the analysis of 37 major 
Lebanese media outlets, revealed that Lebanon’s media is tightly 
aligned with domestic and foreign powers vying for control. Key 
political groups but also wealthy family clans benefit from a weak 
or dysfunctional legal framework that reflects an overall laissez-
faire attitude. They have managed to maintain and extend their 
grip on pockets of public opinion throughout the dramatic events 
that have unfolded in and around the country in the last decades. 
Media in Lebanon is dominated by concentration, politicization 
and polarization. The Lebanese media record 79.3% dependency 
on the government, political parties or personnel. The report con-
cluded that media legislations do not guarantee the transparency 
of media ownership, nor do they provide the necessary mecha-
nisms to prevent conflict of interests.58  
The study showed that there are 37 media outlets with the high-
est followings, concentrated in the hands of eight families and 
three political parties, which arguably explains the dominance of 
one mainstream narrative and absence of a counter narrative. The 
first four television companies are LBCI, Aljadeed, MTV and 
OTV. They are followed by 8 out of 10 viewers, which makes up 
78.1% of viewership. They are respectively owned by the Khayat, 
Daher-Saad, Aoun, and Gabriel Murr families. A similar concen-
tration is also evident in the first four newspapers, Aljumhuriya, 
Alnahar, Alakhbar and Aldyar, which makes up 77.9% of reader-
ship. Their respective main shareholders are the Michel Elias 
Murr, Hariri, and Tueni families, Ibrahim Al-Amine, and Charles 
Ayoub. Radio channels appear to be a little less focused. The first 
four companies are Modern Media Company, Lebanon Free Pro-
ductions and Broadcasting Company, Almada Group and The 
New Audio and Visual Media Company, which accounts for 72% 
of listeners. The top four respective shareholders are the Khazen 
family, the Lebanese Forces, Elias Bou Saab, and the Phalange 
Party.59 Media outlets are owned by the state, current or former 
MPs, ministers or political parties, which led to a media coverage 
of specific political orientations. 
 
Figure 1: Direct ownership of media organizations through political parties.60 
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Figure 2: Direct ownership of media organizations by the state and current members of parliament or people 
holding positions within the government.61 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Direct ownership of media organizations by former members of parliament, candidates for parlia-
ment, or people formerly holding positions within the government.62 
 
 
The second explanation is the complexity of the Syrian-Leba-
nese relations and tension since independence because of the con-
flicting attitudes towards the identification of Lebanese 
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nationalism and dis/union with Syria. The attitude of the Leba-
nese towards the Syrian military intervention in the civil war in 
Lebanon between 1975-1990 shaped the Lebanese attitude to-
wards the Syrian population, whether they are refugees, students 
or employees, even after the withdrawal of the Syrian forces in 
2005 in accordance with the UNSCR 1559. For example, Gebran 
Bassil in his tenure as a Minister of Energy and Water in 2013 
noted, “We do not want Syrian refugees to take our place. Their 
very existence in Lebanon replaces the Lebanese. Lebanon is not 
a loose land!”63 In October 2017, he tweeted “Every alien who is 
on our land without our will is an occupier.”64 Other ministers 
have linked Syrian refugees and the economic crisis and unem-
ployment in Lebanon. Former Minister of Labour Sajaan Qazzi, 
who confined the Syrian labour to cleaning, farming or building 
in 2014,65 told the International Labour Conference in Geneva in 
2014 that unemployment rates among Lebanese have increased 
21% since the Syrian crisis, and that statistics by the Prime Min-
istership show that 34% of crimes are committed by Syrian refu-
gees.66 
More recently, in his speech to the Arab-European ministerial 
meeting in Feb 2019, Gebran Bassil in his tenure as a Foreign 
Minister, claimed that 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon de-
prived Lebanon of 40% of its national output. He warned Euro-
peans that he would not allow Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon, 
and that the idea of integrating them was completely rejected be-
cause they pose a great threat to security and stability.67 These 
figures however, are inconsistent with the official statistics of the 
UNHCR which state that the total number of registered Syrian 
refugees on 31 December 2018 was 948,849.68 Bassil’s notes are 
also inconsistent with the notes of the Executive Director of the 
World Food Programme (WFP). Speaking in front of the commit-
tee at the UK’s parliament, David Beasley noted that Lebanon’s 
economy could have imploded without cash-based assistance 
schemes from Syrian refugees. He argued that one third of cash 
spent by Syrians is used to buy products grown locally; one third 
is processed locally; and the other comes from the international 
market in the Lebanese economy. Beasley argued that Syrian ref-
ugees have the urge to return home. They do not want to be in 
London, Paris or Berlin. They will stay home if given any reason 
of hope.69 
There are two explanations for the mainstream media tendency 
use the term “displaced” rather than “refugees”. The first is that 
non-recognition as refugees is used as a technique to deny their 
merits and rights in accordance with international conventions, to 
which Lebanon is a signatory.70 Arguably, however, while the UN 
definition of refugees as people who have fled war, violence, con-
flict or persecution and have crossed an international border to 
find safety in another country, applies to Syrian refugees, their 
status in Lebanon arguably conflicts with the 1951 convention. 
Article 3 of the convention provides that the contracting states 
shall apply provisions without discrimination as to race, religion, 
or country of origin. Article 17 provides that the contracting states 
shall accord to refugees the most favourable treatment accorded 
to nationals of a foreign country to engage in wage-earning em-
ployment. Article 21 states that the contracting states shall accord 
to refugees treatment as favourable as possible to access housing. 
Article 22 provides that the contracting states shall accord to ref-
ugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect 
to elementary education.71 The second is that the political powers 
do not wish to allow their difficult experiences with the Palestin-
ian refugees since 1948 to reoccur with the Syrians, fearing a re-
peat of the Arab-Israeli conflict during which the number of 
refugees and their descendants continued to increase as the war 
became more insoluble.72 As of 1 January 2019, the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) counted 475,075 Pal-
estinian refugees in its twelve refugee camps in Lebanon.73 
 
Conclusion 
The mainstream narrative has significantly contributed to com-
municating a negative image of Syrian refugees in host societies 
following the 2011 civil war through a stereotyped categorization. 
One dominant mainstream narrative aggravated the negative im-
age of Syrian refugees through overreaction, panic, and focus on 
the most controversial and sensitive problems in the host commu-
nities, such as demography, unemployment, and security. It com-
municated an image of Syrian refugees ranging between being 
pitiful and being ISIS affiliates, claiming they pose a risk to the 
safety, political and economic well-being, and are overall incom-
patible with the culture of the host societies. Therefore, the need 
to expand the image of Syrian refugees in media beyond the dom-
inant stereotype may be increasingly necessary for understanding 
the evolving Syrian refugee crisis in host societies. Especially 
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amid the current resurgence of anti-refugee sentiments and rising 
nationalism,74 it is important to recognise that no one chooses to 
be a refugee. Every minute, eight people leave everything behind 
to escape war, persecution, or terror.75 For many refugees, the 
choice is between the horrific or something worse. 
 
1 Alhurra (2018) This is how Syrian refugees are distributed throughout the 
world. [Online]. Available from: https://www.alhurra.com/a/syrian-refu-
gees/416129.html [Accessed 6 January 2020]. 
2 Connor, P. (2018) Most displaced Syrians are in the Middle East, and about a 
million are in Europe. [Online]. Available from: http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/ [Ac-
cessed 6 January 2020]. 
3 Richard, F. (2014) Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Poli-
tics. American Political Science Review. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/ar-
ticle/observation-context-and-sequence-in-the-study-of-poli-
tics/C27DE4E6F6224BBAB4050605F334873D [Accessed 6 January 2020]. 
4 McKinley, J. (2015) Critical argument and writer identity: Social constructiv-
ism as a theoretical framework for EFL academic writing. [Online]. Available 
from: http://www.englishappliedlinguistics.com/uploads/2/4/1/9/2419477/so-
cial_constructivism_mckinley_2015.pdf [Accessed 26 March 2020]. 
5 Sidney, T. (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
6 Marshall, G. (1998) A dictionary of Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
7 Gilbert, N. (2008) Researching social life. 3rd ed. London: Sage. 
8 May, T. (2002) (ed) Qualitative Research in Action. California: Sage Publica-
tions. 
9 Saad, F. (2018) LebaPedia. [Online]. Available from: 
https://loubnanioun.com/page.php?pages=other_page1&page_type=5 [Ac-
cessed 10 March 2020]. 
10 Richard, F. (2014) Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Poli-
tics. American Political Science Review. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/ar-
ticle/observation-context-and-sequence-in-the-study-of-poli-
tics/C27DE4E6F6224BBAB4050605F334873D [Accessed 6 January 2020]. 
11 Faour, M. (1991) The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal. [Online]. 
Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283466?seq=1 [Accessed 28 
December 2020]. 
12 Salloukh, B.; Verheih, R. A. (2017) Transforming power sharing: From cor-
porate to Hybrid consociation in post-war Lebanon. [Online]. Available from: 
https://brill.com/abstract/journals/melg/9/2/article-
p147_147.xml?rskey=e37qWs&result=1 [Accessed 27 March 2020]. 
13 Lang, F. (2016) The Lebanese post-civil war novel. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
14 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) The second Lebanon war. 
[Online]. Available from: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/hiz-
bullah/pages/hizbullah%20attack%20in%20northern%20israel%20and%20is-
raels%20response%2012-jul-2006.aspx [Accessed 10 April 2019]. 
15 SIPRI (2015) Measuring conflict incidence in Syria. [Online]. Available 
from: http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198712596/sipri-
9780198712596-chapter-2-div1-2.xml# [Accessed 14 March 2020]. 
 
16 CNN (2018) Lebanon fast facts. [Online]. Available from: https://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/meast/lebanon-fast-facts/index.html [Accessed 
1 March 2020]. 
17 A UN ECOSOC accredited organisation that aims to achieve gender equality 
as an essential condition to sustainable social and economic development in the 
MENA region. https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/lebanon/peacebuilding-
organisations/abaad/ 
18 Alaraby (2017) Syrian refugee women outside Lebanese media accounts. 
[Online]. Available from: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/amp//medi-
anews/2017/3/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%
D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A
A-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-
%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
19 Abu Ghazaleh, V. (2017) Syrian refugee women in the Lebanese media, an 
image of victim. [Online]. Available from: http://www.alhayat.com/arti-
cle/854406/%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1 [Accessed 16 
January 2020]. 
20 A specialised organization endeavouring to defend the freedom of opinion 
and expression. https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/lebanon/peacebuilding-
organisations/maharat-foundation/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
21 Farhat, J. (2018) Lebanese media discourse and Syrian refugees: demoniza-
tion and incitement with political movement. [Online]. Available from: 
http://mansiyoun.net/11424/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84
%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8
A%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%8
6/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
22 Vanja, N.; Divana, P. (2014) The role of media in the construction of social 
reality. [Online]. Available from: http://doisrpska.nub.rs/index.php/soci-
oloskidiskurs/article/viewFile/3808/3634 [Accessed 2 April 2020]. 
23 Vanja, N.; Divana, P. (2014) The role of media in the construction of social 
reality. [Online]. Available from: http://doisrpska.nub.rs/index.php/soci-
oloskidiskurs/article/viewFile/3808/3634 [Accessed 2 April 2020]. 
24 Schrader, D. (2015) Constructivism and learning in the age of social media: 
changing minds and learning communities. [Online]. Available from: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/tl.20160 [Accessed 26 March 
2020]. 
25 Gehlbach, H. (2010) The social side of school: why teachers need social psy-
chology. [Online]. Available from: https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/han-
dle/1/4460862/Gehlbach%202010%20EPR.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
[Accessed 27 March 2020]. 
26 Sims, A. (2015) 1 in 50 Syrian refugees in Europe could be an ISIS jihadist, 
minister warns David Cameron. [Online]. Available from: https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/1-in-50-syrian-refugees-in-europe-
Narratives of Transformation  225 
 
 
could-be-an-isis-jihadist-minister-warns-david-cameron-10501249.html [Ac-
cessed 26 February 2020]. 
27 Dearden, L. (2015) The fake refugee images that are being used to distort 
public opinion on asylum seekers. [Online]. Available from: https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-fake-refugee-images-that-are-being-
used-to-distort-public-opinion-on-asylum-seekers-10503703.html [Accessed 
22 January 2020]. 
28 Aljadeed TV on YouTube (2015) The black racist ideas. [Online]. Available 
from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaYF_gdhECE&feature=youtu.be 
[Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
29 Faour, M. (1991) The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal. [Online]. 
Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283466?seq=1 [Accessed 28 
December 2020]. 
30 Hazouri, H. (2015) Hamra is no longer Lebnese. [Online]. Available from: 
https://newspaper.annahar.com/article/203070-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7-
%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-
%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-
%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-
%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7 [Accessed 25 
February 2020]. 
31 UNHCR (2015) The total number of Syrian refugees exceeds the 4 million 
mark for the first time. [Online]. Available from: https://www.un-
hcr.org/ar/news/latest/2015/7/559e1dde6.html [Accessed 25 February 2020]. 
32 Worldometers (2015) Lebanon population. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/lebanon-population/ [Ac-
cessed 25 February 2020]. 
33 Alnahar (2014) The Minister of Labour specifies the professions confined to 
the Lebanese. [Online]. Available from: https://newspaper.annahar.com/arti-
cle/198619-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-
%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-
%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A
9-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8
6%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86 [Accessed 6 March 2020]. 
34 Jad eats bread with a glass of milk. 
35 France 24 (2015) In Lebanese schools: Evening for Syrian children. 
[Online]. Available from: http://webdoc.france24.com/lebanon-syria-children-
school-war-humanitarian-aid/ [Accessed 22 January 2020]. 
36 Syrian Ministry of Education (2019) Laws and decrees. [Online]. Available 
from: http://moed.gov.sy/site/ [Accessed 4 March 2020]. 
37 Fayyad, M. (2016) The role of media in dealing with Syrian asylum. 
[Online]. Available from: https://newspaper.annahar.com/article/479655-
%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-
%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A1-
 
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A [Accessed 16 Jan-
uary 2020]. 
38 Fayyad, M. (2016) The role of media in dealing with Syrian asylum. 
[Online]. Available from: https://newspaper.annahar.com/article/479655-
%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-
%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A [Accessed 16 Jan-
uary 2020]. 
39 Alnahar (2016) Increased air quality deterioration after Syrian asylum. An-
nual cost 151$ since 2011. [Online]. Available from: https://newspaper.an-
nahar.com/article/495516-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-
%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-
%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1
%D9%8A-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A
9-151-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-
%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1-
%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7-
%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B0 [Accessed 1 May 2020]. 
40 MTV (2017) The heads of Lebanese hairdressers are exposed to scourge by 
Syrian scissors. [Online]. Available from: https://www.mtv.com.lb/news/arti-
cles/712019/%D8%B1%D8%A4%D9%88%D8%B3_%D8%AD%D9%84%D
8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A_%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86_
%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%
AC%D8%B2%D9%91_%D9%85%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D
9%82%D8%B5%D9%91_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%
D9%8A%D9%91 [Accessed 1 May 2020]. 
41 Ghandour, T. (2017) On the treatment of the Lebanese media with the reality 
of Syrian asylum. [Online]. Available from: https://raseef22.com/poli-
tics/2017/10/15/%D8%B9%D9%86-
%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC/amp/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
42 Radio Alwan on YouTube (2018) Top ten: The ten most racist positions 
against the Syrians in Lebanon. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaQEPxz4mN0 [Accessed 1 May 2020]. 
43 Farhat, J. (2018) Lebanese media discourse and Syrian refugees: demoniza-
tion and incitement with political movement. [Online]. Available from: 
http://mansiyoun.net/11424/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84
%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8
A%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%8
6/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
44 Farhat, J. (2018) Lebanese media discourse and Syrian refugees: demoniza-
tion and incitement with political movement. [Online]. Available from: 
Narratives of Transformation  227 
 
 
http://mansiyoun.net/11424/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84
%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8
A%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%8
6/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
45 Orient TV on YouTube (2018) A sarcastic song. A new chapter of the incite-
ment of the Lebanese media against the Syrians. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.orient-
news.net/ar/news_show/148195/%D8%A3%D8%BA%D9%86%D9%8A%D8
%A9-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-
%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B6-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-%D8%B6%D8%AF-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%8
6-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88 [Accessed 16 January 
2020]. 
46 Daoud, D. (2018) MTV race for racism: Syrians cause cancer. [Online]. 
Available from: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/medianews/2018/9/5/mtv-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86
-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86 [Ac-
cessed 10 March 2020]. 
47 Orient TV on YouTube (2018) Open racism against Syrians in a Lebanese 
program. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWPAwzUfcjs&feature=youtu.be [Ac-
cessed 22 January 2020]. 
48 Insider Monkey (2017) 10 most racist counties in Asia. [Online]. Available 
from: https://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/10-most-racist-countries-in-asia-
536402/ [Accessed 12 March 2020]. 
49 Orient TV on YouTube (2018) A racist song against the Syrians on a Leba-
nese channel. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECCcZoxyPXA&feature=youtu.be [Ac-
cessed 16 January 2020]. 
50 Lebanon Files (2017) In collaboration with the UNHCR, Riachi launches a 
campaign to eradicate tension between the Lebanese and the Syrian. [Online]. 
Available from: http://www.lebanonfiles.com/print.php?id=1214862 [Accessed 
5 March 2020]. 
51 Ghandour, T. (2017) On the treatment of the Lebanese media with the reality 
of Syrian asylum. [Online]. Available from: https://raseef22.com/poli-
tics/2017/10/15/%D8%B9%D9%86-
%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC/amp/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
52 Revise figure1, figure2, and figure3. 
 
53 Trombetta, L. (2016) Media landscapes: Expert analyses of the state of me-
dia. [Online]. Available from: https://medialandscapes.org/country/lebanon 
[Accessed 2 April 2020]. 
54 El-Richani, S. (2016) The Lebanese media: Anatomy of a system in perpet-
ual crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
55 Kozman, C. (2018) Book Review: The Lebanese media: Anatomy of a sys-
tem in perpetual crisis. [Online]. Available from: https://brill.com/abstract/jour-
nals/mjcc/11/1/article-p111_8.xml?rskey=SbE6fm&result=9 [Accessed 28 
March 2020]. 
56 El-Richani, S. (2016) The Lebanese media: Anatomy of a system in perpet-
ual crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
57 Kozman, C. (2018) Book Review: The Lebanese media: Anatomy of a sys-
tem in perpetual crisis. [Online]. Available from: https://brill.com/abstract/jour-
nals/mjcc/11/1/article-p111_8.xml?rskey=SbE6fm&result=9 [Accessed 28 
March 2020]. 
58 RSF (2018) Media in Lebanon: A familial issue. [Online]. Available from: 
https://rsf.org/ar/news/-118 [Accessed 11 March 2020]. 
59 See figures 1, 2 and 3. 
60 Reporters Without Borders (2018) Media in the political maze. [Online]. 
Available from: http://lebanon.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/ 
[Accessed 15 March 2020]. 
61 Reporters Without Borders (2018) Media in the political Maze. [Online]. 
Available from: http://lebanon.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/ 
[Accessed 15 March 2020]. 
62 Reporters Without Borders (2018) Media in the political Maze. [Online]. 
Available from: http://lebanon.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/ 
[Accessed 15 March 2020]. 
63 Karima, S. (2019) Basil’s racist tweets. Did Mrine Le Pen’s infection spread 
to Lebanon? [Online]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/intel-
lect/sociol-
ogy/2019/7/17/%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7
%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A
9-%D9%87%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84%D8%AA-
%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%89 [Accessed 25 December 2020]. 
64 Karima, S. (2019) Basil’s racist tweets. Did Mrine Le Pen’s infection spread 
to Lebanon? [Online]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/intel-
lect/sociol-
ogy/2019/7/17/%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7
%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A
9-%D9%87%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84%D8%AA-
%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%89 [Accessed 25 December 2020]. 
65 Alnahar (2014) The Minister of Labour specifies the professions confined to 
the Lebanese. [Online]. Available from: https://newspaper.annahar.com/arti-
cle/198619-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-
%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-
%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A
9-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8
6%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86 [Accessed 6 March 2020]. 
66 Farhat, J. (2018) Lebanese media discourse and Syrian refugees: demoniza-
tion and incitement with political movement. [Online]. Available from: 
Narratives of Transformation  229 
 
 
http://mansiyoun.net/11424/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84
%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
A-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8
A%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%8
6/ [Accessed 16 January 2020]. 
67 Alarabiya (2019) Bassil attacks Syrian refugees and warns Europe of their 
danger. [Online]. Available from:  https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-
world/syria/2019/02/05/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-
%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8A-
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-
%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-
%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7-
%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85.html 
[Accessed 5 February 2020]. 
68 UNHCR (2019) Refugee situation. [Online]. Available from: 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71 [Accessed 24 February 
2020]. 
69 Musaddique, S. (2019) Lebanon economy could have ‘imploded’ without 
Syrians. [Online]. Available from: https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/leb-
anon-economy-could-have-imploded-without-syrians-1.822393 [Accessed 8 
February 2020]. 
70 Orient TV on YouTube (2017) The image of Syrian refugee women in the 
Lebanese media. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6GYYX6OfquQ&feature=youtu.be [Ac-
cessed 22 January 2020]. 
71 UNHCR (2019) Refugee situation. [Online]. Available from: 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71 [Accessed 24 February 
2020]. 
72 Ghazal, K. (2017) Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: The reality of living and 
the will to advance. [Online]. Available from: http://www.alhayat.com/arti-
cle/899563/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86
%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%B4-
%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85 [Accessed 12 
March 2020]. 
73 UNRWA (2020) Where we work. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon [Accessed 25 December 
2020]. 
74 UNHCR (2019) UN High Commissioner for Refugees warns of risks to the 
fight against statelessness. [Online]. Available from: https://www.un-
hcr.org/uk/news/press/2019/10/5d9adf5c4/un-high-commissioner-refugees-
warns-risks-fight-against-statelessness.html [Accessed 26 December 2020]. 
75 UNHCR (2019) World Humanitarian Day – August 2010. What would you 
do? [Online]. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/takeaction/ [Accessed 
26 December 2020]. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
